Hastings Law Journal
Volume 30 | Issue 2

Article 7

1-1978

Recovery for Fraud in a California Property
Transaction
Kristin Adrian

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kristin Adrian, Recovery for Fraud in a California Property Transaction, 30 Hastings L.J. 475 (1978).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol30/iss2/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Recovery for Fraud in a California Property
Transaction
By Kristin -ldrian*

Introduction
California Civil Code section 33431 prescribes the damages recoverable for fraud in property transactions and the proper means of measuring those damages. Unfortunately, the judiciary has commonly
interpreted this section as preventing a recovery equal to that which
had been available under the general tort measure of damages. 2 As a
result, many courts have
turned to alternative remedies in an attempt to
3
evade section 3343.
This Note attempts to clarify the proper application of section
3343 as to the measure of damages and the kinds of damages recoverable. More specifically, this Note contends that the enactment of section 3343, rather than attempting to limit the recovery for fraud in
property transactions, reflects the legislature's determination that the
benefit-of-the-bargain measure allows the defrauded party to recover
more than "the detriment proximately caused"; 4 the general measure of
damages for torts. Because in many cases, prior to the enactment of
section 3343, courts calculated damages for fraud under the benefit-ofthe-bargain measure, 5 damages were often awarded for a type of loss
which was not the result of the defendant's actions. The enactment of
section 3343 ensures that damages for fraud be measured by out-ofpocket loss. It does not limit the kinds of damages that may be recovered. This Note will demonstrate that, properly applied, section 3343
* B.A., 1976, University of California, Irvine. Member, Third Year Class.
1. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343 (West Supp. 1977). Hereafter all code citations refer to the
California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
2. See, eg., Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948); Jacobs v.
Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 137 P.2d 500 (1943).
3. See, ag., Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Savage v. Mayer,
33 Cal. 2d 548, 203 P.2d 9 (1949); Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 298 P.2d 667
(1956); Adams v. Harrison, 34 Cal. App. 2d 288, 93 P.2d 237 (1939).
4. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970).
5. Wood v. Niemeyer, 185 Cal. 526, 197 P. 795 (1921); Hines v. Brode, 168 Cal. 507,
143 P. 729 (1914); Rogaff v. Bartles, 115 Cal. App. 429, 1 P.2d 517 (1931).
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will result in a recovery identical to that available under the general
provision for the measure of damages for other torts.

The Traditional Measures
Two principal measures of damages have been applied in cases of
fraud in property transactions, benefit-of-the-bargain and out-of-pocket loss. 6 Benefit of the bargain is the measure generally applied in
breach of contract actions because the goal is to place the injured party
in the position he would have been in had the promisor performed the
contract. 7 Out-of-pocket loss is the general measure of damages for
the commission of a tort.8 The rationale is that the damages must not
place plaintiff in a better position than if the wrong had not been committed.9 Approximately two-thirds of the states make an exception to
the general tort measure of damages and measure damages for fraud by
the benefit-of-the-bargain rule.10 This exception may result from the
fact that fraud, although a tort, only arises in situations of a contractual
nature. A few jurisdictions, including California, have adhered to the
6. There are objections to both measures. See generally Comment, Recovery in Deceit Actions in Caifornia, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 193-95 (1959); Note, Measure of Damages
for FraudandDeceit, 47 VA. L. REv. 1209 (1961). Objections with respect to the benefit-ofthe-bargain rule are mainly that, first, it is difficult to place a monetary valuation upon the
representations, and second, it is questionable whether a "contract theory of damages" is
appropriate in an action which is based on tort. DAWSON & PALMER, CASES ON
RESTITUTION 235 (2d ed. 1958). The primary objection to the out-of-pocket loss rule can
best be summarized as follows: "[A] fraudulent person can in no event lose anything by his
fraud. He runs the chance of making a profit if he successfully carries out his plan and is
not afterward brought to account for it; and if he is brought to account, he will lose nothing
by his misconduct." 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs § 1392, at
442 (3d ed. 1968). But cf C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 121, at 453-54 (1935),
where the author states: "The force of this last argument, however, is somewhat weakened
by the fact that in most states, exemplary damages may be given by the jury in cases of
deliberate or wanton fraud ...
" (footnote omitted). California courts have always recognized that Civil Code § 3343 does not preclude the allowance of exemplary damages.
Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 763, 192 P.2d 935, 946 (1948); see CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 3357 (West 1970). Subsequent cases adhering to this view include: Ward v. Taggart, 51
Cal. 2d 736, 743, 336 P.2d 534, 538-39 (1959); Eatwell v. Beck, 41 Cal. 2d 128, 134-35, 257
P.2d 643, 647 (1953); Channell v. Anthony, 58 Cal. App. 3d 290, 320, 129 Cal. Rptr. 704, 723
(1976); Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, 159 Cal. App. 2d 196, 204, 323 P.2d 843, 849
(1958).
7. The Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 26 Cal. 2d 634, 160 P.2d 804 (1945);
Abrams v. Motter, 3 Cal. App. 3d 828, 83 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1970); Winegar v. Gray, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 22 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962); Wickman v. Opper, 188 Cal. App. 2d 129, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 291 (1961). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970).
9. Valdez v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1954).
10. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 875 (1967). See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 121 (1935); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 110 (4th ed. 1971). This measure is also
known as the warranty rule.
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general tort measure, out-of-pocket loss, in cases of fraud in property
transactions."
It is important to note that the measure of damages does not determine the kinds of damages to which a plaintiff may be entitled. As a
result of a single transaction, an individual may have several causes of
action. For example, one may be entitled to damages for both the difference in value of the property and lost profits. The measure of damages operates only after liability for such causes of action has been
established.' 2 The same measure of damages is then applied to each
kind of harm to determine the extent of the recovery under each claim.
Under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule a successful plaintiff will recover the difference between the fair market value of the property received in the transaction and the fair market value of the property as
fraudulently represented. Under the out-of-pocket-loss rule the plaintiff will recover the difference between the fair market value of the
property received and the fair market value of the property exchanged.
Under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule, the amount given in exchange
for the property received is not taken into consideration. Under the
out-of-pocket-loss rule, the value of the property as represented is not
considered.
To illustrate this difference, assume that the plaintiff was fraudulently induced to purchase property. Assume also, that the property
given in exchange has a fair market value of $50,000. Finally, assume
that the property received was fraudulently represented as being fertile
farm land. If this had in fact been the case the land would have had a
fair market value of $60,000. Since the land was actually of poor quality, it had a fair market value of only $45,000. Under a benefit-of-thebargain measure of damages, plaintiff would recover the difference between the value of the property received, $45,000, and the value of the
property as represented, $60,000, or $15,000. Under an out-of-pocketloss measure, plaintiff would recover the difference between the value
of the property received, $45,000, and the value of the property given in
exchange, $50,000, or $5,000.
11. This rule, also known as the tort rule, has been followed in England, Arkansas,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. E.g., Danielson v. Skidmore, 125 Ark. 572, 189 S.W. 57 (1916); Carlson v. Burg, 137 Minn. 53, 162 N.W. 889 (1917);
Peek v. Derry, 37 Ch. D. 541 (1888). Prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the
federal courts followed the out-of-pocket loss rule. Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116 (1900);
see Jacobs v. Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 916, 137 P.2d 500, 501 (1943), where the
court says that because Erie requires the federal courts to follow the "state decisions on
matters of general law the main support for the minority rule would appear to have
collapsed."
12. Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957).
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History of Section 3343
Until 1935, California Civil Code section 333313 provided the general rule regarding the measure of damages for recoveries in tort, including damages for fraud in a property transaction. Section 3333
provides: "For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by
this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment
proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or

not."
Prior to 1935, although there was considerable confusion as to
which measure of damages should be applied under section 3333,14 the
California courts usually held that the amount which would compensate one for "all the detriment proximately caused" was to be deterIt was further
mined by the benefit-of-the-bargain measure.15
recognized that "all the detriment proximately caused" included not
only the loss determined under the benefit-of-the-bargain measure, but
also any other "legitimate expenditures" incurred as a result of the
fraud. 16
In 1935, the California legislature responded to the confusion as to
the proper measure of damages for fraud in a property transaction by
enacting Civil Code section 3343.17 As originally enacted, section 3343
provided:
One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is
entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that
with which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that

which he received, together with any additional damage arising from
the particular transaction.
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to deny to any person
having a cause of action for fraud or deceit any8 legal or equitable
remedies to which such person may be entitled.'
When the question of the application of section 3343 came before
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970).
14. Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 762, 192 P.2d 935, 946 (1948).
15. Wood v. Neimeyer, 185 Cal. 524, 197 P. 795 (1921); Hines v. Brode, 168 Cal. 507,
143 P. 729 (1914); Rogaffv. Batles, 115 Cal. App. 429, 1 P.2d 517 (1931). The supreme court
recognized that the benefit-of-the-bargain measure was an extreme rule and stated that "it
should therefore be applied only in clear cases and upon just terms." Hines v. Brode, 168
Cal. 507, 511, 143 P. 729, 730 (1914). As a result, the out-of-pocket loss rule was occasionally applied as the measure of damages under § 3333. MacDonald v. Roeth, 179 Cal. 194,
176 P. 38 (1918); Cross v. Bouck, 175 Cal. 253, 165 P. 702 (1917); Garstang v. Skinner, 165
Cal. 721, 134 P. 329 (1913); Barbour v. Flick, 126 Cal. 628, 59 P. 122 (1899).
16. Hines v. Brode, 168 Cal. 507, 510, 143 P. 729, 730 (1914).
17. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 536, § 1, at 1612 (amended 1971).
18. Id. In 1971 the legislature amended § 3343 to indicate the nature of additional
damages recoverable.
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the California Supreme Court in Bagdasarianv. Gragnon,19 the court

concluded that the statute provided the exclusive measure of damages,20 thereby eliminating entirely the possibility of a recovery based
upon the benefit-of-the-bargain measure. Among the factors supporting this conclusion were the broad language of section 3343, the uncer-

tainty that had previously existed as to the applicable measure of
damages, and the decisions of the lower courts following the enactment
of section 3343.21

Application of Section 3343 as Affected by Subsequent
Circumstances
Although section 3343 specifies which measure of damages is to be
applied, it does not indicate from when the damages are to be measured. Damages under section 3343 are generally determined according to the facts as they existed as of the date of the fraudulent
transaction.22 If foreclosure results from the fraud, however, a damage
award determined as of the date of the transaction may be either more
or less than one's actual out-of-pocket loss.
The problem of a foreclosure resulting from fraud came before the
California Supreme Court in Garrettv. Perry.23 In that case, plaintiff
purchased a ranch in reliance upon defendant's representations that it
would support 5,000 head of cattle. When those representations
19. 31 Cal. 2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948). In Bagdasarian,plaintiffs purchased a farm in
reliance upon fraudulent representations of the value of the fruit crops it contained. The
purchasers defaulted when the income from the crops proved smaller than represented.
The sellers brought suit to foreclose. The court awarded the purchasers damages based
upon the difference between the purchase price and the acutal value of the farm at the time
of the original transaction. This amount was applied toward the purchase price thereby
preventing a foreclosure.
20. Id. at 762, 192 P.2d at 946. Dissenting, Justice Schauer felt that the majority's
conclusion was not in accordance with the legislative intent behind § 3343. He felt that the
court "could justifiably hold that the purpose of the Legislature was not prohibitively to
substitute the 'out-of-pocket' rule-for the 'benefit-of-the-bargain' rule but, rather, permit.
sively toprovide an additional or alternative remedy or measure of damages which might be
applied in proper cases." Id. at 765, 192 P.2d at 947.
21. Id. at 759-62, 192 P.2d at 944-46. Among the cases decided by lower courts holding that § 3343 limited the measure of damages to out-of-pocket loss in all cases of fraud in a
property transaction were Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478, 481-82 (S.D. Cal. 1939);
Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482, 85 P.2d 885 (1938); Jacobs v. Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 913, 137 P.2d 500 (1943); Rothstein v. Janss Investment Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 113
P.2d 465 (1941). See also Note, Deceit Damages in California." Old Problem-New Departure?, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 325, 341 (1974).
22. Hancock v. Williams, 99 Cal. App. 2d 80, 82, 221 P.2d 129, 131 (1950).
23. 53 Cal. 2d 178, 346 P.2d 758 (1959). Two recent decisions make it clear that the
teaching of Garrett remains valid. Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina View
Heights Dev., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1977); Pepper v. Underwood, 48
Cal. App. 3d 698, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1975).
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proved to be false, plaintiff was unable to operate the ranch profitably
and became delinquent on his installment payments, whereupon the
deeds of trust were foreclosed and title revested in defendant.
Unknown to plaintiff, the fair market value of the ranch when
purchased was $530,000. Because of the fraudulent representations
plaintiff agreed upon a purchase price of $700,000. Therefore, at the
time of the fraudulent transaction, plaintiffs out-of-pocket loss was the
difference between the fair market value of the property received,
$530,000, and the purchase price, $700,000, or $170,000. As a consequence of the fraud, however, plaintiff suffered foreclosure. Plaintiff,
therefore, received nothing, and actually lost only the $159,000 in payments made prior to the foreclosure. In other words, the actual value
of the property received was zero, and the value given in exchange was
$159,000. As an ultimate consequence of the fraud, plaintiff was actually out-of-pocket $159,000, rather than the $170,000 indicated if damages were measured as of the time of the fraudulent transaction.
Recognizing that "the statute contains nothing to show that the
difference must be calculated solely on the basis of the facts existing at
the time the contract was made or performed," 24 the court held that
section 3343 "must be applied realistically so as to give the defrauded
person his actual out-of-pocket loss, and, where necessary to reach that
result, the court must consider subsequent circumstances. ' 25 The court
therefore awarded $159,000 plus additional damages as the out-ofpocket loss.
In Garrett,by attempting to award plaintiff his actual out-of-pocket loss, the court actually reduced the plaintiffs potential recovery by
taking subsequent circumstances into consideration. As such, Garrett
involves an early recognition of the fact that section 3343 was enacted
in an attempt to award damages only for losses actually suffered as a
result of defendant's fraudulent conduct. Judicial attempts to compensate for out-of-pocket losses while taking subsequent circumstances
into account have not always had the effect of reducing plaintiffs
award. 26 It has been assumed that consideration of subsequent cir24.

53 Cal. 2d 178, 184, 346 P.2d 758, 762 (1959).

25. Id. The supreme court also considered the subsequent circumstances in determining whether or not the defrauded party was entitled to additional damages. Most expenditures induced by the fraud will not be made until after the fraudulent transaction, and
therefore their very existence cannot be determined without considering subsequent events.
26. Burkhouse v. Phillips, 18 Cal. App. 3d 661, 96 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1971); Holder v.
Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 267 Cal. App. 2d 91, 72 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1968); McCue v. Bruce
Enterprises, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 2d 21, 39 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1964).

See also Glendale Fed.

Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina View Heights Dev., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135 Cal. Rptr.
802 (1977); Ford v. Cournale, 36 Cal. App. 3d 172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1973); Hahn v. Food

Serv. Equip. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 412, 33 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1963).
wood, 48 Cal. App. 3d 698, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1975).

But cf. Pepper v. Under-
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when those circumstances have
cumstances is also appropriate
27
increasedplaintiff's award.
If, for example, at the time of a fraudulently induced purchase
there was no difference between the purchase price and the actual
value of the property, plaintiff would have no damages under the outof-pocket-loss rule at the time of the purchase. However, if the fraud

caused plaintiff to lose the property after payment of part of the
purchase price, plaintiff could recover for the payments already made.
In this case, subsequent circumstances have increased plaintiff's out-ofpocket loss.

Additional Damages
Section 3343 determines which measure of damages should be applied in cases of fraud in a property transaction. The circumstances of
each case will determine as of what date the measure of damages shall
be calculated. The statute also addresses itself to the issue of what

constitutes recoverable damages.
In Bagdasarianv. Gragnon, the California Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he right to recover additionaldamages does not refer to
the measure of damages, but, rather, to such matters as expenses or
other consequential injury28 resulting from the fraud." 29 The court's

interpretation of the additional damage provision of section 3343 is in
accordance with the general rule that a defrauded plaintiff may recover

for "all the detriment proximately caused," which 30includes necessary
expenses and indirect injuries caused by the fraud.

27. Although the court in Garrett was concerned with preventing the plaintiff from
receiving a windfall, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the court intended to
limit its holding to those circumstances. On the contrary, the court stated that "[t]he fact
that values must ordinarily be considered as of the time of the fraudulent transaction does
not mean that the court cannot consider circumstances other than value which operate to
increase or reduce the injury." 53 Cal. 2d 178, 186, 346 P.2d 758, 763 (1959) (emphasis
added).
28. It should be noted that the court has not used the term "consequential injury" to
mean "consequential damages" such as arise from a breach of contract. The court is actually referring to those injuries which are a proximate consequence of the fraud.
29. Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744,762-63, 192 P.2d 935, 946 (1948); see notes
19-21 & accompanying text su.pra. As authority for this proposition, the court cited Jacobs
v. Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 137 P.2d 500 (1943). Jacobsillustrated the application
of the additional damages provision by stating: "That latter provision was evidently intended to cover a situation where for example a buyer was obliged to move from the property that he had been fraudulently induced to purchase on account of the dangerous
character of the premises. In such a case he could not only recover the difference between
the amount that he had paid for the property and its actual value but also recover the expense of moving." Id. at 917, 137 P.2d at 502.
30. See generally C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF DAmAGrs § 469 (1935); W. PRossEa, LAW
OF TORTS § 110 (4th ed. 1971). See also REsTATSMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(b)
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The supreme court later elaborated on the recoverability of expenditures by explaining that "expenditures which were reasonable
under the circumstances . . .may ordinarily be recovered, insofar as
they have been lost or rendered fruitless because of the deceit."' 3 1 This
is particularly true where the expenditures were necessary to maintain
32

a going business.

Despite that recognition, Garrett v. Perry33 is one of the few cases
which have actually awarded damages for expenditures induced by the

fraud. 34 In Garrett,plaintiff, induced by fraudulent representations to
purchase a ranch, thereafter made expenditures for its operation, care,

and improvement. As a result of the subsequent foreclosure which resulted from the fraud, the benefit from those expenditures was totally

lost to plaintiff. The supreme court approved a damage award for the
expenditures upon the assumption that the amount awarded was not

offset by any income.
The amendment to section 3343 codifies that aspect of prior case

law.35 Because it does not attempt to change the law, its enactment

may have been an attempt on the part of the legislature to encourage
wider judicial recognition of the availability of damages for fruitless
expenditures.
(1965), which also permits such additional recovery. This is true in jurisdictions following
either the benefit-of-the-bargain or the out-of-pocket loss measure of damages, and was recognized in California prior to adoption of§ 3343. See note 16 & accompanying text supra.
31. Garrett v. Perry, 53 Cal. 2d 178, 186, 346 P.2d 758, 763 (1959). The courts have
adhered strictly to the requirement that expenditures be rendered fruitless because of the
fraud. For example, in McNeill v. Bredberg, 192 Cal. App. 2d 458, 13 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1961),
the purchaser of residential property made repairs to the drainage system. Those repairs
would not have been necessary had the property been as represented. However, since the
plaintiff retained the property and received the benefit of the repairs, the expenditures constituted improvements for which plaintiff was not entitled to additional damages. In contrast, where the plaintiff receives no benefit from the expenditure, recovery is allowed. For
example, in Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d 218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962), the plaintiff purchased a dwelling house in reliance upon representations by the sellers and a termite
inspector that there were no infestations or indications of termites, dry rot, or fungus. In
fact the house was damaged by termites to such an extent as to require its demolition. Due
to the subsequent circumstance of demolition various expenditures on the house were rendered fruitless, and plaintiff was allowed to recover their cost as additional damage.
32. See Garrett v. Perry, 53 Cal. 2d 178, 346 P.2d 758 (1959); N.J.K. Corp. v. Pacific
Vital Foods Stores, 159 Cal. App. 2d 522, 324 P.2d 96 (1958); Lawson v. Town & Country
Shops, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 2d 196, 323 P.2d 843 (1958); Hover v. Harout, 123 Cal. App. 2d
860, 267 P.2d 823 (1954).
33. 53 Cal. 2d 178, 186-87, 346 P.2d 758, 763 (1959); see text accompanying notes 23-25
supra.
34. See, e.g., Garrett v. Perry, 53 Cal. 2d 178, 346 P.2d 758 (1959-);-Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d 218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1962).
35. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3343(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977) provides: "Amounts actually and
reasonably expended in reliance upon the fraud" are recoverable as additional damages.
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The amendment also specified two types of additional damages
available to a defrauded seller. According to section 3343 (a)(2), additional damage includes "[a]n amount which would compensate the defrauded party for loss of use and enjoyment of the property to the
extent that any such loss was proximately caused by the fraud. '36 Additionally, section 3343(a)(3) provides: "Where the defrauded party has
been induced by reason of the fraud to sell or otherwise part with the
property in question, an amount which will compensate him for profits
the
or other gains which might reasonably have been earned by use of
37
property had he retained it" is recoverable as additional damage.
Subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) of section 3343 were construed in the
case of Channell v. Anthony.38 Plaintiffs in that case were fraudulently
induced to sell their farm to defendant. An agreement provided that
Mr. Channell was to manage the farm. In return for his management,
the Channells were to be allowed to reside on the property and were to
receive ten percent of the net income in excess of $15,000. Although
plaintiffs were induced to believe that they were signing escrow papers
based on this agreement, plaintiffs actually signed a grant deed to the
property. Upon discovery of this fact, plaintiffs sought recovery for
the fraud under section 3343.
The court held that, by electing to affirm the contract, plaintiffs
gave up any rights to the use of the property or to any claim of profits
from the property, except as otherwise provided by the contract. 39 In
fact, the court held that when a seller foregoes his right of rescission,
subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) are inapplicable, unless, as here, the contract itself creates such rights to use or profits.4°
That interpretation effectively eliminates subdivisions (a)(2) and
(a)(3) from the statute in all cases except where the seller retains some
interest in the property under the contract of sale, or where the seller
sues to rescind the contract. The ruling improperly excluded plaintiffs
from the class protected by subdivision (a)(3), which clearly applies to
one who "has been induced by reason of the fraud to sell or otherwise
part with the property in question," and is suing to recover "for profits
or other gains which might reasonably have been earned by use of the
property had he retained it."
The court should not have limited plaintiffs to the profits they
were to receive under the contract. They would have been entitled to
those even in the absence of the fraud. Section 3343(a)(3) allows
plaintiffs to recover, as additional damages, all those profits which they
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
38. 58 Cal. App. 3d 290, 129 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1976).
39. Ad.at 315, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
40. Id. at 317, 129 CaL Rptr. at 721.
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might reasonably have earned had they retained the property, not
merely the ten percent of the net income over $15,000 as provided in
the contract.
Section 3343(a)(4) provides an illustration of "additional damages" to which a defrauded buyer is entitled. Thus, one who "has
been induced by reason of the fraud to purchase or otherwise acquire
the property in question" may recover "an amount which will compen-

sate him for any loss of profits or other gains which were reasonably
anticipated and would have been earned by him from the use or sale of
the property
had it possessed the characteristics fraudulently attributed
to it."''4
In Hartman v. Shell Oil Co.,42 plaintiff sought recovery of lost
profits under subdivision (a)(4).

Plaintiff had been induced to

purchase an old Shell Oil station upon representations that Shell Oil
Company either would expand it, or would transfer plaintiff to the new
station across the street should it be purchased by Shell. Although
Shell acquired the new station, it failed to transfer plaintiff. Instead
Shell operated the new station in competition with plaintiff.
The court wisely did not restrict subdivision (a)(4) to fraudulent
representation of physical characteristics. Instead it noted that "[t]he
section is not limited by its language to physical characteristics of the
property induced to be acquired. '4 3 That interpretation of subdivision

(a)(4) allows damage awards based on representations as to nonphysical characteristics as well. 44
In Hartman, the nonphysical characteristic of expansion or transferability was fraudulently attributed to certain property. Because the

court recognized that section 3343(a)(4) was not limited to physical
characteristics, plaintiff could recover "for any loss of profits or other
gains which were reasonably anticipated and would have been
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977). There are three additional requirements stated in § 3343(a)(4) which provides: "[Liost profits from the use or sale of the
property shall be recoverable only if and only to the extent that all of the following apply:
(i) The defrauded party acquired the property for the purpose of using or reselling it for a
profit.
(ii) The defrauded party reasonably relied on the fraud in entering into the transaction and
in anticipating profits from the subsequent use or sale of the property.
(iii)
Any loss of profits for which damages are sought under this paragraph have been proximately caused by the fraud and the defrauded party's reliance on it."
42. 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 137 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1977).
43. Id. at 248, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
44. One commentator suggests that subdivision (a)(4) was not intended to exclude recovery of lost profits when the fraud concerned a matter other than a characteristic of the
property sold. This would extend application of subdivision (a)(4) not only to representations as to nonphysical characteristics, but to representations as to collateral matters as well.
Note, Deceit Damages in California: Old Problem-New Departure?, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW.
325, 351 (1974).

November 1978]

RECOVERY FOR FRAUD

earned" 45 had the property possessed the characteristic of either expansion or transferability.
The court also noted that "[t]he 1971 amendment to Civil Code
section 3343 does not speak in terms of present or past 'characteristics,'
as distinguished from characteristics of the property represented to be
acquired in the future." 46 The normal problems of determining causation and amount of damage may be exacerbated when dealing with
property fraudulently represented to possess the capacity to acquire
certain characteristics in the future. The general rule, however, provides that if the fact of damages is certain, any uncertainty as to the
amount of damages should be resolved against the one who caused the
damages to occur.47 Therefore, once the cause and existence of the
damages have been established, the plaintiff is entitled to some
recovery.
Several appellate court cases awarded lost profits as additional
damages prior to the addition of subdivision (a)(4) to section 3343.48
Under the section as amended, however, a defrauded purchaser may
recover lost profits only if all the requirements of subdivision (a)(4) are
met. The addition of those express requirements should result in only
a minimal decrease in the availability of lost profits in comparison to
the situation under prior case law. The requirement that plaintiff must
reasonably have relied on the fraud in entering into a transaction 49 is
merely an expression of one of the elements of fraud. 50 The requirement that the lost profits for which damages are sought be proximately
caused by the fraud5 l merely states the general tort rule that recoverable damages are only those which are the proximate result of the
breach of an obligation. 52 The requirement that the plaintiff have ac53
quired the property for the purpose of using or reselling it for a profit5 4
adds a factor not always required under preamendment case law.
However, a careful court would always accord substantial weight to
this circumstance as bearing on the presence of actual loss to plaintiff.
Thus the limiting effect should be slight.55
45. CAL. CIV. CoDE § 3343(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
46. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 247-48, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
47. Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 875, 229 P.2d 348, 355 (1951).
48. Sixta v. Ochsner, 187 Cal. App. 2d 485, 9 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960); Lawson v. Town &
Country Shops, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 2d 196, 323 P.2d 843 (1958).
49. CAL CiV. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(ii) (West Supp. 1977).
50. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 108 (4th ed. 1971).
51. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3343(a)(4)('ii) (West Supp. 1977).
52. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 110, at 735 (4th ed. 1971).
53. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(i) (West Supp. 1977).
54. See note 48 supra.
55. As to the limiting effect, see generally Note, Deceit Damages in Californi." Old
Problem-New Departure?,14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 325, 349-50 (1974).
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In order to prevent a court from awarding what amounts to the
benefit of the bargain under the guise of lost profits pursuant to subdivision (a)(4), the legislature added subdivision (b)(1). This provides
that nothing in section 3343 shall "[plermit the defrauded person to
recover any amount measured by the difference between the value of
'56
property as represented and the actual value thereof.
Upon a cursory examination it may appear that subdivision (b)(1)
negates the effect of subdivision (a)(4). However, this is not the case.
Subdivision (a)(4) pertains to "additional damages." Subdivision
(b)(1) restricts only the method of measuring damages. Indeed, recovery of lost profits as "additional damages" may, in some circumstances,
equal the amount which would be recovered if the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages were used. This does not mean, however,
that damages were measured contrary to the prescriptions of subdivision (b)(1).
To illustrate a situation in which recovery of lost profits will equal
the amount of damages arrived at under a benefit-of-the-bargain measure, assume that a purchaser believes, based on the seller's fraudulent
representations, that he is acquiring property worth $200,000 for the
bargain price of $175,000. In fact, the property is worth only the
$175,000 paid. Therefore, the purchaser has no loss under an out-ofpocket measure of damages. Under the benefit-of-the-bargain measure, however, the purchaser is damaged $25,000, the difference between the purchase price and the value as represented. If the
purchaser bought the property to use as a dwelling house, he would not
meet the requirement that the property be acquired for the purpose of
using or reselling it for a profit.57 Therefore, he could recover nothing
in the way of lost profits. However, if at the time of purchase the purchaser had a second agreement to resell the property to a third party for
$200,000, assuming the other requirements of subdivision (a)(4) were
met, the purchaser could recover the $25,000 lost profits. In such a
situation the amount of lost profits recoverable equals the damages as
determined under the benefit-of-the-bargain measure.
Additional Remedies
Section 3343(b)(2) provides: "Nothing in this section shall . . .
[d]eny to any person having a cause of action for fraud or deceit any
legal or equitable remedies to which such person may be entitled. ' 58
56. CAL. CrV. CODE § 3343(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343(a)(4)(i) (West Supp. 1977).
58. As originally enacted the statute contained a similar provision which provided:
"Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to deny to any person having a cause of action
for fraud or deceit any legal or equitable remedies to which such person may be entitled."
Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 536, § 1, at 1612 (amended 1971).
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When first interpreting section 3343 the California Supreme Court
stated that the subdivision did not pertain to the measure of damages,
the primary concern of the statute, but rather, "preserve[d] such other
remedies as the right to rescind or the right to recover on a warranty, if
any." 59 Thus subdivision (b)(2) offers additional evidence that, in enacting section 3343, the legislature intended to continue to allow recovery for all kinds of damages which had been proximately caused by the
fraud. Several of the remedies utilized by California courts to permit
plaintiffs to recover for injuries stemming from defendants' fraudulent
actions are examined below.
The Quasi-Contractual Theory of Unjust Enrichment

In Ward v. Taggart,60 the California Supreme Court recognized
that a quasi-contractual remedy to prevent unjust enrichment in cases
of fraud in the purchase, sale, or exchange of property was not precluded by section 3343.61

Ward involved a real estate broker who

falsely represented that he had an exclusive listing on a tract of land.
Whereas plaintiffs initial offer of $4,000 per acre was refused, his subsequent offer of $5,000 per acre was accepted. Plaintiff learned later
that the broker had never been given a listing on the property, had
withheld plaintiffs offers and had purchased the property himself for
$4,000 per acre. Through his resale to plaintiff at $5,000 per acre he
made a secret profit of $1,000 per acre for a total profit of $72,049.20.
Defendant was held to be an involuntary trustee of the secret
profit he had acquired through his dealings with plaintiffs and liable to
them therefore. This was based on several factors. First,' the court
noted that the public policy of California did not permit one to "take
advantage of his own wrong."' 62 The court went on to find quasi-contractual liability on two separate grounds: (1) Civil Code section 2224
authorizes a quasi-contractual remedy to prevent one from being unjustly enriched at the expense of another 63 (2) a violation of the duty of
59. Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d at 763, 192 P.2d at 946.
60. 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
61. Id. at 741 & n.1, 336 P.2d at 537. This theory of recovery is still available to a
qualified plaintiff because the 1971 amendment to § 3343 retained the provision which allows a defrauded party to pursue other remedies. A qualified plaintiff would be one who
had been defrauded by an individual owing a duty of honest and fair dealing to the plaintiff.
In Ward, the defendant's duty arose from his status as a real estate broker. Cf. Note,
Recovery in DeceitActions in Calfornia, 11 HASTiNGS L.L 183, 188 (1959) (duty to disgorge
would rest on anyone regardless of status).
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517 (West 1970) provides: "No one can take advantage of his
own wrong."
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2224 (West 1954) provides: "One who gains a thing by fraud,
accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongffl.act, is, unless
he has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the
benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it."
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a real estate broker to be honest and truthful in his dealings subjects

him to quasi-contractual liability for any resultant unjust enrichment. 64
In Ward, the court stated that, "Taggart's obligation does not arise

from any agreement between him and plaintiffs. It arises from his
fraud and violation of statutory duties. His fraud is not waived, for it

65
is the very foundation of the implied-in-law promise to disgorge."

Thus plaintiffs recovery was essentially the same as it would have been
had he waived the tort and sued in quasi-contract to recover his benefit
of the bargain. Furthermore, under the method developed in Ward,
waiver of tort and suit in quasi-contract, punitive damages are also
available. Recognizing that "Taggart's obligation for his fraud does
not arise from contract but is imposed by law," the court held that "the
judgment for exemplary damages clearly falls within section 3294."66

Since Ward, the California Supreme Court has not applied an involuntary trustee approach to unjust enrichment in a real estate transaction. The appellate courts have likewise made little use of this
theory of recovery. 67 Although Ward established an additional remedy available under section 3343, its primary significance lies in the
fact that it emphasized the court's willingness to give
meaning to the
68

provision of section 3343 allowing other remedies.
Fraud By A Fiduciary

The remedy afforded by Civil Code section 3333 has been applied

as an alternative means of recovery in cases of fraud by a fiduciary in

property transactions. 69 Resort to this section is largely the result of
64.
65.

CAL. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 10150, 10176 (West 1964).

66.

Id.

51 Cal. 2d 736, 743, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (1959).

67. See Coleman v. Ladd Ford Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 90, 29 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1963), in
which the second district upheld the decision of the trial court awarding damages on the
basis of the loss-of-the-bargain rule under the reasoning of the Ward decision. The court
extended the involuntary trustee concept beyond real estate transactions involving brokers
into the field of ordinary business transactions. The fourth district, in Hartman v. Shell Oil
Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 246-47, 137 Cal. Rptr. 244, 248 (1977), quotes extensively from
Coleman in support of the proposition that damages need no longer be limited to out-ofpocket losses.
68. Perhaps its effect was most clearly stated by Justice Schauer in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Ward when he stated, "[T]his decision, by its ingenious innovation
and application of a constructive trust-unjust enrichment-quasi-contractual theory to support an award of exemplary damages as against one of the defendants, avoids much of the
evil effect of the majority holding in Bagdasarian v. Gragnon." 51 Cal. 2d 736, 744, 336
P.2d 534, 539 (1959).
69. Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 562 P.2d 316, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977). Since
this is an alternative remedy to that provided by § 3343, the amendment to § 3343 will have
no effect on the damages which are recoverable in cases of fraud by a fiduciary under §
3333.
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the inaccurate interpretation given to section 3343 and the notion that
recovery against a fiduciary under section 3333 would be more extensive than under section 3343.
In Liodas v. Sahad70 the California Supreme Court recognized
that section 3333 states "the broader fiduciary standard." 7 1 In Liodas,
the jury was instructed on two theories of liability: (1) ordinary fraud,
and (2) fraud by a fiduciary. However, the jury was instructed on only
one measure of damages: the measure of damages for fraud by a fiduciary. That instruction was based on section 3333. The court held that
the failure to instruct on the measure of damages for ordinary, or nonfiduciary fraud, based upon the language of Civil Code section 3343,
was prejudicial error because the jury had no choice but to apply the
the fidubroader fiduciary measure of damages even if they found that
72
ciary relationship had terminated at the time of the fraud.
This holding is a recognition of the difference in the damages
available in cases involving ordinary fraud and in cases involving fraud
by a fiduciary. The court did not state which measure of damages
constituted the broader fiduciary measure. The court merely reiterated the words of section 3333 by stating that the broader fiduciary
measure is "all the detriment proximately caused." 73 "All the detriment proximately caused," however, is measured by the out-of-pocket
loss rule. In fact, both sections 3333 and 3343 require out-of-pocket
loss as the measure of damages. More extensive damages may be recovered from a fiduciary, not because a different or broader measure
applies, but because a fiduciary owes a more extensive duty74 and a
breach of that duty may be the proximate cause of more detriment.
For example, a purchaser has no duty to inform the seller that the actual value of the property is greater than the amount at which the seller
is willing to sell. If one in a fiduciary capacity to the seller were
purchasing the property, however, he would have a duty to disclose to
70.
71.
72.

19 Cal. 3d 278, 562 P.2d 316, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977).
Id. at 284, 562 P.2d at 319, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
Id.

73.

Id.

74. A fiduciary has the duty "to act in the utmost good faith and to refrain from the
slightest false statement or concealment which would reasonably influence the judgment of
[his] principals." Schoenberg v. Romike Properties, 251 Cal. App. 2d 154, 162, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 359, 365 (1967). A breach of this duty renders the fiduciary guilty of constructive
fraud. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1573 (West 1954) provides:
"Constructive fraud consists:
1. In any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent intent, gains an advantage
to the person in fault, or anyone claiming under him, by misleading another to his
prejudice, or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him, or
2. In any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent, without respect to actual fraud."
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the seller the actual value of the property.7 5 Hence the seller in the
latter case could recover this discrepancy, not because the benefit-ofthe-bargain measure applies, but because the broader fiduciary duty
creates the critical nexus between breached duty and resulting harm.
The development of a separate rule for fraud by a fiduciary had a
somewhat uncertain beginning in the case of Gagne v. Bertran.76 The
court rejected appellee's contention that the trial court correctly
awarded damages based on the benefit-of-the-bargain rule.77 Instead,

the court held that, "the damages, whether for deceit or negligence,
must be measured by the actual losses suffered because of the misrepresentation. ' 78 In support of that proposition the court cited Civil Code
sections 170979 and 3333. 80 The fact that sections 1709 and 3333 were

applied rather than section 3343, although unexplained, is important to
the interpretations given this case by later courts.
Although the application of section 3333 may have been the result
of a recognition that defendant's fraud was outside the scope of section
3343,81 the court nevertheless interpreted section 3333 as calling for the
same measure of damages as section 3343.82 That interpretation supports the proposition that section 3343 was not intended to change the
damages available under section 3333. Section 3343 merely abolished
benefit of the bargain as the measure of damages in all property-fraud
actions. The same formula applies under section 3333 as under section
3343; in other words, out-of-pocket loss plus additional damages.
Gagne v. Bertran83 was erroneously interpreted as recognizing a

separate measure of damages for situations involving fraud by a fiduci75. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1965).

106, at 697 (4th ed. 1971); see also

76. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
77. Id. at 490, 275 P.2d at 21-22.
78. Id. at 490, 275 P.2d at 22.
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (West 1973) provides: "One who willfully deceives another
with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage
which he thereby suffers."
80. 43 Cal. 2d at 490, 275 P.2d at 22.
81. The court may have reasoned that the fraud was only collateral to the purchase,
sale or exchange of property and therefore outside the scope of § 3343. The defendant was
not buying, selling, or exchanging property. His fraudulent representations applied to a soil
test he had conducted. The mere fact that this was one of the factors which induced the
plaintiff to purchase the property tested from a third party should not bring defendant's
fraud within § 3343.
82. See Justice Schauer's dissenting opinion in which he states: "The effect of the majority opinion is to limit plaintiffs' recovery to an artificially limited so-called 'out-of-pocket'
loss (see Civ. Code, § 3343)." 43 Cal. 2d at 493, 275 P.2d at 23. See generally Note, Torts.
Deceit Determinationand Measurement ofDamages, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 356, 357 (1955), for
the proposition that "section 3343 must now be read together with sections 1709 and 3333
when the court is measuring the damages in a deceit action."
83. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
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ary in several subsequent cases. 8 4 Those cases developed upon the
statement in Simone v. McKee85 that the broader provisions of sections
1709 and 3333 are applicable in cases of fraud by a fiduciary. 6 Because the damage award in Simone was susceptible of the interpretation that a benefit-of-the-bargain measure was applied,87 some courts
interpreted the phrase "broader provisions of section 3333" to mean
that section 3333 called for a benefit-of-the-bargain measure in cases of
fraud by a fiduciary.8 8 The court's reference to "the broader provisions of section 3333," however, merely reflects the fact that in cases of
fraud by a fiduciary a broader range of plaintiffs claimed losses will be
legally attributable to the fiduciary's breach of duty.
Secret Profits
A final remedy available under section 3343(b)(2) is an action by a
principal to recover secret profits made by his agent. 89 As a general
rule an agent is not permitted to make any secret profit out of the subject of his agency.90
In Savage v. Mayer,91 an action was brought to recbver secret
84. McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, L.T.D., 456 F.2d 1170, 1183 (2d Cir.
1972); Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278,283-84,562 P.2d 316,319, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637-38
(1977); Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 145 n.3, 85 Cal. Rptr.
693, 699 (1970); Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 294-95, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610, 625
(1966); Walsh v. Hooker & Fay, 212 Cal. App. 2d 450, 458-59, 28 Cal. Rptr. 16, 22 (1963);
Prince v. Harting, 177 Cal. App. 2d 720,730, 2 Cal. Rptr. 545, 551 (1960); Simone v. McKee,
142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 315-16, 298 P.2d 667, 673 (1956).
85. 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 315-16, 298 P.2d 667, 673 (1956).
86. Pepitone v. Russo, 64 Cal. App. 3d 685, 134 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1976); Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1966); Walsh v. Hooker & Fay, 212 Cal. App.
2d 450, 28 Cal.Rptr. 16 (1963); see McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, L.T.D., 456
F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1972).
87. In Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 298 P.2d 667 (1956), the damages,
whether measured under the out-of-pocket standard or the benefit-of-the-bargain standard,
amounted to $4,000 less commission. The purchase price was $13,000. Both the actual
value of the property, and the amount plaintiff would have received if he had received the
benefit of the transaction amounted to $17,000. Under either measure, therefore, plaintiff
was entitled to $4,000, the difference between $17,000 and the purchase price of $13,000.
88. Pepitone v. Russo, 64 Cal. App. 3d 685, 689, 134 Cal. Rptr. 709, 711 (1976). There
is another line of cases which have not been misled by Simone and which apply an out-ofpocket measure to cases of fraud by a fiduciary. Overgaard v. Johnson, 68 Cal. App. 3d
821, 137 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1977); Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 Cal. App. 3d 278,
136 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1977); Roberts v. Karr, 178 Cal. App. 2d 535, 3 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960);
Wright v. Rogers, 172 Cal. App. 2d 349, 342 P.2d 447 (1959); Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App.
2d 656, 300 P.2d 855 (1956).
89. Section 3343, as amended, also has no effect on actions to recover secret profits.
90. Savage v. Mayer, 33 Cal. 2d 548, 551, 203 P.2d 9, 10 (1949); Langford v. Thomas,
200 Cal. 192, 198-99, 252 P. 602, 603-04 (1926); REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY, §§
387, 388 (1958).
91. 33 Cal. 2d 548, 203 P.2d 9 (1949).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

['Vol. 30

profits reaped by defendant while purchasing corporate stock for plaintiff. Through fraudulent misrepresentation defendant had obtained a
sum of money consisting of the difference between the cost of the stock
and the price that plaintiff paid for it.
Defendant claimed that section 3343 operated to limit the principal's recovery since the profits had been acquired through fraudulent
representations. The California Supreme Court held that section 3343
did not operate to limit a principal's recovery. In so holding, the court
stated:
In the absence of special circumstances, moneys received by one in
the capacity of agent are not his, and the law implies a promise to
pay them to the principal on demand. . . .It follows that the principal's right to recover does not depend upon any deceit of the agent,
but is based upon the duties incident to the agency relationship and
upon the fact that
all profits resulting from that relationship belong
92
to the principal.
The Savage court cited Adams v. Harrison93 in support of their
decision. Adams had also involved an action to recover secret profits
in a real estate transaction, and the fourth district had held that section
3343 did not apply in the case where a principal waived the cause of
action based on fraud and sued instead for the return of his money.
The court explained that "[i]n such an action the actual value of the
land is not material and has nothing to do with the amount which the
plaintiff has paid and which he seeks to have returned." 94
Conclusion
The damages which may be recovered in the case of fraud in a
property transaction amount to "all the detriment proximately caused."
Damages are measured by out-of-pocket loss and the amendment to
section 3343 expressly recognizes several categories of additional damages which may be recovered. Most importantly, under limited circumstances, lost profits qualify as additional damages. In the case of
fraud by a fiduciary the recovery will be the same whether the damages
are determined under section 3333 or section 3343. Furthermore,
damages may be recovered through other remedies such as a quasicontractual theory of unjust enrichment or an action to recover secret
profits. Therefore, courts need not struggle to escape section 3343, but
rather should attempt to work within its flexible provisions.

92. Id. at 551, 203 P.2d at 10-11.
93. 34 Cal. App. 2d 288, 93 P.2d 237 (1939).
94. Id. at 300, 93 P.2d at 244.

